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Abstract
This paper considers the potential impact that the nascent technology of quantum computing
may have on society. It focuses on three areas: cryptography, optimization, and simulation of
quantum systems. We will also discuss some ethical aspects of these developments, and ways to
mitigate the risks.
1 Introduction
Quantum mechanics is our best physical theory for describing and predicting the behavior of small
(and maybe also larger) objects. It was developed in the first quarter of the 20th century by
people like Planck, Einstein, Bohr, Heisenberg, and Schro¨dinger. The predictions it makes about
the behavior of small quantum systems are often weird and counter-intuitive, but have never been
contradicted by experiments. Computer science as a formal discipline started in the 1930s with the
work of Church, Turing [Tur36] and others.1 Its impact of ever-faster and ever-smaller computers
on our society is already enormous, and still growing and deepening further.
The idea of using quantum mechanics to fundamentally improve the speed and/or security of
computers has been around as a great idea on the crossroads of physics, computer science, and
mathematics for nearly four decades. It has been a significant area for two decades, and it may
start to become feasible technology in the next decade. Without going into the mathematics, we
can identify three quantum-mechanical effects that make quantum computers tick:
• Superposition allows a quantum computer’s memory to be in many classical states “at the
same time,” each state having a certain weight or “amplitude” (which may be negative). For
example, a quantum bit (“qubit”) is a superposition of the two classical values 0 and 1.
• Interference allows different superpositions to combine in a way that is similar to waves:
positive and negative amplitudes will cancel each other out, while amplitudes with the same
sign will add up.
• Entanglement allows different parts of the quantum computer, or even different quantum
computers that are far away from each other, to be correlated in ways that are not possible
classically.
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1The first digital computers were built a few years later. Of course, there was already much earlier (informal)
work, like Pascal and Leibniz’s 17th century work on machines for arithmetic calculations, Babbage and Lovelace’s
19th century work on the Analytical Engine, and even the still-mysterious 1st century BC Antikythera mechanism.
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These effects enable types of computation that are very different from—and in some cases much
faster than—our ordinary, “classical” computers. Large quantum computers have not been built
yet (the biggest ones at the time of writing have around 10–20 qubits), but a massive effort and
investment is underway in academia and companies like Google and IBM to build them in the next
decade or so.
Contrary to what one sometimes reads in popularizing accounts, quantum computers do not lead
to exponentially faster computation across the board (nor does entanglement lead to faster-than-
light communication). In fact, the set of computational problems where we know that quantum
computers enable substantial speed-up is still quite small, and we can in fact prove that for many
other problems quantum computers are no better than classical computers (see Aaronson [Aar08]
for an accessible first introduction to the limits of quantum computers). One can think of a quantum
computer as a massively complicated box, with exponentially many computations going on inside
of it, whose combined outcomes we can only look at in very limited ways, like peeking inside the
box through a few tiny holes.
Quantum computing, beyond its potential technological impact in the form of faster and/or
more secure computers, already has an impact on fundamental physics (for example, quantum
information theory and entanglement are gaining ground as an important viewpoint for material
sciences, and even for understanding black holes [HH13]), and on mathematics and computer science
(as a new computing paradigm, but also as a new source of mathematical proof techniques [DW11]).
It also has a bearing on philosophical questions, from metaphysics (David Deutsch argues that a
quantum computer would be a vindication of the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechan-
ics [Deu98]) to epistemology (our notions of “knowledge” and “information” should be adjusted to
the weird proprieties of quantum superposition and entanglement) and ethics.
This paper will assume quantum computers of significant size will be realized at some point,
and will try to chart the potential societal impact this will have. In other words, it will look at the
areas where quantum computing may really have an impact beyond the realms of academia. In
our view, the three main areas of potential impact are cryptography, optimization, and simulation
of quantum systems, and we will examine these in the next section. After that we will look into
ethical aspects of this impact, and ways to mitigate the risks.
2 Potential societal impact
2.1 Breaking and remaking cryptography
Cryptology is the art and science of secure communication in the presence of adversaries who try
to eavesdrop on secret communication, forge identities, etc. Cryptology has a constructive branch
(cryptography) and a destructive branch (cryptanalysis). The first branch designs schemes to
“encrypt” information in such a way that only the intended parties can access it, leading to secure
communication, e-commerce, unforgeable digital signatures, etc. The second branch tries to break,
or “decrypt” such schemes. The productive tug of war between cryptographers and cryptanalysts
(codemakers and codebreakers) has been going on for decades, some would even say for millennia:
Suetonius [Sue07, Divus Julius, §57] already describes a simple scheme used by Julius Caesar to
encrypt his letters: shift all characters in the alphabet by 3, so ‘a’ becomes ‘d’, ‘b’ becomes ‘e’ etc.
This scheme is so weak that once one knows the shift (maybe after trying out all 25 possibilities) one
can decrypt the texts. Since then, especially since the 1970s, much more sophisticated encryption
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schemes have been designed and deployed in practice.
Roughly speaking, much of cryptography is based on mathematical problems that are easy to
compute in one direction, but hard to compute in the other direction.2 A prime example of this
(no pun intended) is multiplication: it is very easy to multiply together two large numbers p and
q to obtain their product N = p · q; but going the other way, computing the factors p and q
from N , is believed to be a hard computational problem for classical computers. How can we use
easy-one-way/hard-the-other-way problems for cryptography? The basic idea of the RSA crypto-
system is as follows. Suppose Alice wants to enable the rest of the world to send her encrypted
messages, that only she can decrypt. She can choose two large prime numbers p and q (her secret
key), and only make public their product N and an associated “encryption exponent” (this is her
public key). Using the public key, anybody else can encrypt their messages to Alice in such a way
that Alice can decrypt the messages using the extra information of her secret key. In contrast,
classical eavesdroppers without this extra information can learn the encrypted message by tapping
the communication channel, but cannot (as far as we know) decrypt the message in any reasonable
amount of time.
The first big hit of quantum computers was Peter Shor’s 1994 efficient quantum algorithm for
finding the prime factors of large numbers [Sho97]. A sufficiently large quantum computer would
thus be able to compute the secret key from the public key of the RSA scheme, and hence can
decrypt the encrypted messages sent to Alice. While some parts of classical cryptography are
not affected by such attacks, much of our online communication, e-commerce etc., is protected
by cryptographic schemes based on the hardness of factoring or similar problems that can also be
efficiently solved by a quantum computer, such as “discrete logarithms.” Shor’s discovery was really
the point when the area of quantum computing started to move from a fringe activity to a central
area of physics and computer science, with lavish attention from funding agencies (interested in
both basic science and technology) as well as spy agencies (interested in breaking enemy codes).
The breaking down of much of our cryptography would have a large impact on our economy
and society, much of which assumes we can safely communicate, transfer money, sign documents
electronically, etc. A world without reliable electronic payments and bank transactions would come
to a grinding halt—clearly cash payments or barter are not good alternatives. Governments and
many other organizations rely crucially on the ability to communicate secretly. Even if it will take
decades to actually build a quantum computer big enough to factor large numbers, for things that
have to remain secret for the next 20 to 30 years (a typical requirement for government secrets),
the future quantum threat is already an acute problem now: enemy spies or the mafia can already
hoover up encrypted communication today, store it, and decrypt it later when a quantum computer
becomes available.
We mention two ways to remedy this, neither of them ideal. The first is so-called post-quantum
cryptography. This is classical cryptography, based on computational problems that are easy to
compute in one direction but hard to compute in the other direction even by quantum computers.
Factoring does not fit this bill because of Shor’s quantum algorithm, but there have been proposals
for using other computational problems, for instance based on lattices or on error-correcting codes.
The problem with such schemes is that they have barely been tested. We are not able to prove that
2In the theory of computing, a computational problem is considered “easy” if it can be computed by an algorithm
whose running time grows at most polynomially with the input length (i.e., a running time like n2 or n3 for inputs
of n bits). Otherwise the problem is considered “hard”; often such hard problems take a running time that grows
exponentially or nearly-exponentially with the input length n. The latter type of problem is not solvable in reasonable
amounts of time for large input length.
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factoring is a hard problem for classical computers, but at least one good piece of evidence for such
computational hardness is that many sharp mathematicians have tried for decades to find efficient
factoring algorithms, and failed. The alternative computational problems that have been suggested
for post-quantum cryptography, have not yet undergone such scrutiny and there may well exist an
efficient quantum (or even classical!) algorithm for breaking them.
The second way to remedy the quantum attack on much of current-day cryptography is to use
quantum cryptography, which uses quantum effects to design more secure cryptographic systems.
The key property is the fact that measuring an unknown quantum state will disturb it, and such
disturbance can be detected by the honest parties. The most famous example of such quantum
cryptography is the BB84 “quantum key distribution” scheme of Bennett and Brassard [BB84]:
using quantum communication, Alice and Bob (who trust each other but not the quantum channel
over which they communicate) can either establish a shared secret key unknown to any eavesdrop-
per, which they can then use for secure communication—or they can detect the presence of the
eavesdropper. This scheme can be proved3 secure, even against quantum adversaries with unlim-
ited amounts of time and computing power. Because the required hardware for such quantum
cryptography is much simpler than for a large quantum computer, commercial implementations of
these schemes already exist. These have repeatedly been hacked due to practical imperfections in
their implementation, but they are getting better.4
2.2 Faster search and optimization
Governments, companies, and other organizations often use their computers to solve large search or
optimization problems: to finding efficient allocations of resources to the tasks they need to solve,
to schedule work (or classes, like in schools and universities), to search through large data files, to
design energy-efficient chips or airplanes, etc. For many such tasks, quantum computers can offer
significant speed-ups, for example for search problems [Gro96], finding the minimum or maximum
of a given function over some finite domain [DH96], finding the shortest route between two points
on a map [DHHM06], approximately solving large systems of linear equations (in a somewhat weak
sense) [HHL09], as well as other problems. See [Mon16] for a recent survey.
The area of machine learning deserves special mention here. This area has really taken off in
the last 5 years or so, with spectacular progress in areas like image recognition, natural language
processing, and even in beating the best human players at games like Go and poker. This is all
based on classical computers. Usually in machine learning one is given data and one has to find
some model or hypothesis that “fits” this data well. Finding a well-fitting or even optimally-fitting
model for the data is an optimization problem that can sometimes be solved better or faster on a
quantum computer using the techniques mentioned above.
One problem with most of these approaches is that they typically need to be able to access, in
quantum superposition, large amounts of classical data. Having very large quantum-addressable
classical memories is technologically very demanding, and will not be realized any time soon. Also,
the speed-up these methods give over the best classical approaches is usually only “polynomial”
3Under several idealizing assumptions that are approximately true in practice: quantum mechanics is the correct
description of Nature; Alice’s lab and Bob’s lab is secure from the eavesdropper; their communication channel is
“authenticated” (they know they’re talking to one another); and their apparatuses have low and benign errors.
4If neither post-quantum nor quantum cryptography works, then as a last resort one can always put one’s secrets
on a high-quality memory device detached from the internet and put this (or even a print-out) in a physical safe.
However, this has many obvious disadvantages over computer-based cryptography.
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(typically quadratic or less); it is not the exponential improvement that Shor’s algorithm gives
over the best known classical algorithms for factoring large numbers. Still, even such polynomial
speed-ups can make a big difference in practice particularly when applied to very large inputs.
2.3 Simulating quantum systems
A third area where quantum computers are likely to have an impact, is in simulating the behavior
of quantum systems. This was in fact the main reason for Richard Feynman to dream up the idea of
quantum computing in the first place [Fey82]: a quantum state involving n particles has a number
of parameters that is exponential in n, so it seems plausible that simulating its behavior on a
classical computer takes exponential time (though, like many plausible things in complexity theory,
we do not know how to prove this). In contrast, a quantum computer can in principle simulate the
behavior of any other quantum system efficiently: one would effectively write a program with the
physical laws acting on the quantum system that one wants to simulate, and then let the quantum
computer execute this program to see what happens. This way, a quantum computer with, say,
electron-based qubits could mimic the behavior of other quantum systems, such as specific atoms
or molecules.
A big chunk of the computing time of supercomputers today is spent on simulating quan-
tum systems, and a quantum computer could make a huge difference here. Some applications,
such as figuring out properties of specific molecules that are beyond the reach of our current best
computers, could already be addressed by a quantum computer with a few hundred well-behaved
qubits [PHW+15, WLA13].5
Further applications occur where we do not just want to simulate the behavior of one specific
quantum system, but are looking for a quantum system with certain desirable properties. A good
example is drug design: when pharmaceutical companies look for drugs against specific afflictions,
they basically look through enormous lists of possible molecules, trying each one out (in simulation
or experiment) to find one that has the right properties. Quantum computers can help in two
interlocking ways: they can figure out the properties of a specific molecule faster than classical
computers can, and they can search through large sets of promising molecules for one that actu-
ally has the desired behavior, using Grover’s search algorithm or some other quantum method for
optimization. Also the design of more efficient materials and more efficient production of fertil-
izer [RWS+17] are often mentioned as potential applications here. Fertilizer is so important for the
world’s food production that even a small efficiency improvement would already be very valuable.
3 Ethical aspects
3.1 Cryptography
Like any technology, cryptography can be used for good or bad: to protect activists against an
overbearing government, but also by terrorists for planning attacks without being overheard. The
same is true for cryptanalysis: it can be used by the NSA to thwart those terrorists, but also to
conduct mass-surveillance and read the emails of millions of innocent people. Clearly, a breakdown
of cryptography due to quantum computers will have serious implications. Much information that
is now kept secret for good reason would be out on the street. Privacy would be much diminished.
5In contrast, running Shor’s algorithm to break current cryptography would require thousands or even millions of
qubits, depending on how error-free we can make these qubits and the operations upon them.
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Governments would have great trouble protecting their workings against foreign spies. The right
balance between privacy and justified surveillance for security purposes is a very tricky ethical
question, and this balance changes if the set of available cryptographic tools changes. Quantum
cryptography may become available, but is likely to be both much more expensive and more clunky
than RSA, and may only be within reach of governments and large organizations.
3.2 Increased inequality
What about the other two areas of potential impact, faster search/optimization, and simulation
of quantum systems? From a utilitarian perspective, increased efficiency in areas like planning,
resource allocation, machine learning, and development of new drugs and materials, seems mostly
a good thing: reducing waste, freeing up time, increasing profit, curing diseases, etc. Of course,
such efficiency gains could also facilitate terrorism, mass-surveillance, and other undesirables, but
this caveat applies to better technology in general. Indeed, if these efficiency gains due to quantum
computers are going to be widespread and accessible to all, there would be little to say about their
specific ethical aspects.
It is anybody’s guess how quantum computing power will spread through society in the next
few decades, but it is quite possible that it will not be widely accessible. This could lead to a more
unequal distribution of power and wealth: between America and the rest of the world, and between
a few big companies and the rest of society.
First, most of the companies that have started to invest heavily in quantum computing (hard-
ware as well as software) are American: IBM, Google, Microsoft, and Intel. These companies
are already patenting many of the ideas, including some based on freely-available academic re-
search. This could lead to American businesses dominating (or even monopolizing) commercial
quantum computing, similar to the way Silicon Valley dominates much of current classical comput-
ing. Even worse, because quantum computing development takes massive investment, entrenched
giant companies are less likely to be disrupted by competition from small start-ups than in clas-
sical computing. The European Union is trying to counter this potential American dominance by
promoting collaboration between European academia and European companies as part of its recent
Quantum Flagship initiative, but Europe does not have tech companies of quite the same heft as
the US giants. Moreover, at the level of government agencies, few countries (except maybe China
and the EU as a whole) can match the secret but massive budgets available at the NSA, some of
which are used for quantum computing research.
Second, even if American companies and/or government do not end up dominating the de-
velopment of the hardware and software of quantum computing, wide accessibility of quantum
computing power is not guaranteed. Certainly initially it will be exceedingly expensive to build
even one medium-size quantum computer. The risk here is that only a few large companies will be
able to afford quantum computers, will use the efficiency gains to outcompete their competitors,
and form monopolies or oligopolies. For example, if quantum computers turn out to be great at
developing new drugs, and only one pharmaceutical company has access to a quantum computer,
it could dominate its industry. This would weaken competition in our free-market economy, shift
power from individuals and small businesses to one or a few large companies, and lead to growing
inequality in society.
6
3.3 Making the impact positive
The same above-mentioned risks of increased inequality were present in the 1950s and 1960s, when
few companies were able to afford the new mainframe computers peddled by the likes of IBM.
Since then, of course, the wonders of Moore’s law have made classical computing power available to
most people—first through PCs in the 1980s, and more recently in the form of cheap smartphones
that have more computing power than even the strongest machines from the 1960s. Interestingly,
nowadays one can even cheaply “rent” massive computing power through the cloud from Amazon
and other companies.
The hope is that the future of quantum computing goes along the same lines: first a few very
expensive and moderately powerful machines, and then subsequent generations of cheaper and
more powerful quantum computers. It is likely that quantum computers will remain rather bulky
and expensive in comparison with today’s computers, and it is neither likely nor necessary that
many people will have one on their desk. The best way to make quantum computing power widely
available is to build a few very strong quantum computers, and to enable people to run programs
on them through the cloud, maybe for a fee. IBM’s “Quantum Experience” [IBM16], which lets
everyone play around with a 5-qubit computer through the cloud for free, is a toy version of this
idea. Wide accessibility of quantum computing power might even lead to a new twist on the “maker
movement,” where lots of enthusiastic amateurs start to simulate and play around designing new
molecules, new materials etc., thereby actually reducing the power of big pharmaceutical and other
companies as compared to today.
Ideally such accessibility would come about for commercial reasons, much like Amazon’s cloud
services. If this does not happen and companies start hoarding quantum computing power, other
parties (governments or otherwise) should try to rectify this. Unfortunately, governments them-
selves could also have an interest in monopolizing access to quantum computers. However, one large
quantum computer that is made accessible through the cloud by some organization for commercial
or benevolent reasons (say by the Gates Foundation, or by a country like Norway) is already enough
to counter many of the risks of monopolization of access to quantum computing.
In addition to access to the computing power, there is also the issue of access to knowledge.
Until recently, most of the knowledge produced about quantum computing (with the exception of
some research by intelligence agencies like the NSA) was made publicly available in the form of
academic research papers. More recently, with the growing influence of large companies, there is a
bigger push to patent knowledge or even to hoard it. Researchers both in academia and industry
have a responsibility to counteract this by insisting on publication of their work, maybe after a
short delay for commercial reasons. This is justified by the general reason why science should be
open: it leads to faster spreading and development of knowledge, as well as to faster detection and
correction of errors.
4 Summary and conclusion
Quantum computers are getting closer to realization, and they could have significant impact on
society in several areas. First, they will be able to break much of current cryptography, endangering
our digital economy, though they also provide cryptographic alternatives. Second, they will be able
to optimize all sorts of processes better, leading to efficiency gains. Third, they will allow for much
faster simulation of quantum-mechanical systems, with the potential of better design of drugs,
materials, etc.
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We also briefly considered the ethical aspects of this. In destroying much of classical crypto-
graphy, quantum computers reduce online privacy and make it harder to hide things (both for good
and for bad purposes). If access to quantum computers is limited to one or few governments, it
could upset the balance of power between different countries; and if this access is limited to a few
big companies it could lead to monopolies or oligopolies, increasing inequality in society.6
We feel the best way to ensure that the positive impact of quantum computers outweighs
the negative is through openness and accessibility: scientific knowledge should be made publicly
available as much as possible, and quantum computing power should be made accessible through
the cloud. Both scientists and governments (and companies as well, partially through the laws
issued by those governments) have a responsibility here.
Acknowledgment: Thanks to Joran van Apeldoorn, Harry Buhrman, and the anonymous ref-
erees for helpful comments that improved the presentation of this paper.
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